- Call your followers to Christ: challenge them to follow Christ in all areas of their life (from families, jobs, to there own finances)
- Model what God wants your followers to become
- Face your heart so you can help your followers face their hearts
- Take your folloers into the action of ministry with you
- Establish heart relationships (be willing to open up)
- Be men of prayer
- Understand the struggles of the heart (independence, self-reliance, indentity struggles, pride)
- Call your followers from the interests of men to the interests of God
- Call your followers to take up the cross
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Leadership Conference on Mentoring the Heart
Monday, May 26, 2008
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
Kairos Missions Course in Constanta, RO
And this is me swimming in the Sea---I LOVE the water
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
The Romanian Revolution: Part II
The Revolution brought Romania vast attention from the outside world. Initially, much of the world's sympathy inevitably went to the National Salvation Front government under Ion Iliescu, a former member of the Communist Party leadership and a Ceauşescu ally prior to falling into the dictator's disgrace in the early 1980s. The National Salvation Front, composed mainly of former members of the second echelon of the Communist Party, immediately assumed control over the state institutions, including the main media outlets, such as the national radio and television networks. They used their control of the media in order to launch virulent propaganda-style attacks against their new political opponents, the traditional democratic parties, which re-emerged after more than 50 years of underground activity.Controversy:
To this day, there is some controversy about what may have been going on behind the scenes. At what point did which leaders of the army and police abandon Ceauşescu? Had they merely decided that Ceauşescu had become a liability, or did they genuinely want deeper change? How long before taking power on December 22, 1989, did the National Salvation Front (FSN — Frontul Salvării Naţionale), composed entirely of figures from the old regime, begin organizing itself and to what degree? Some conjecture that the formation may date back as far as 1982.
The identity of the terrorists remains a mystery to this day. No person has ever been officially charged with committing acts of terrorism, and this fact has raised many suspicions concerning the relationship between the terrorists and the new government.
It is likely that there was an ongoing conspiracy by members of a second echelon of the Communist Party, supported by Moscow possibly since 1982. These conspirators took advantage of the events in Timisoara to begin their drive to power. The claimed "terrorist" activity of those days were likely diversions organised by the same communist party conspirators to scare the population into seeking a "savior" and therefore embrace the "Salvation Front" without looking for new, uncompromised leaders. The Front appeared very well organised and suddenly replaced most revolutionaries pushed forward by the people from the street. Another interesting coincidence is the fall of the communist regimes in all Eastern Europe at about the same time, even if most of the citizens of these countries were very isolated from one each other. The lack of drive for democratic change in 1989 Romania was and is poorly understood in the West. The large majority of the population only wanted a better life and not necessarily democracy or regime change. This explains why Iliescu, a member of the communist party since his youth and who always repeated his socialist ideals has been in power for almost all 1990s decade. The events in 1989 Romania were not a revolution, just a coup d'etat.
There are several conflicting views on the events in Bucharest that led to the fall of Ceauşescu in 1989. One view is that a portion of the Romanian Communist Party CPEx
(Political Executive Council) tried and failed to bring about a scenario similar to that in the rest of the Eastern bloc Communist countries, where the Communist leadership would resign en masse, allowing a new government to emerge peacefully. Another view is that a group of military officers successfully staged a conspiracy against Ceauşescu. Several officers have claimed that they had been part of a conspiracy directed against Ceauşescu, but evidence beyond their own claims is scant, at best. The latter view is buttressed by a series of interviews given 2003–04 by former Securitate Lieutenant Colonel Dumitru Burlan Ceauşescu’s long-time bodyguard. The two theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. [Romanian Revolution memorial right]
In November 1989, Ceauşescu had visited Mikhail Gorbachev who asked him to resign: Ceauşescu flatly refused. The question of a possible resignation arose again on December 17. 1989 when Ceauşescu assembled the CPEx (Political Executive Council) to decide upon the necessary measures to crush the Timişoara uprising. Although meeting minutes were taken, and were presented at the trial of several CPEx members, the surviving stenograma (minutes) at the time of the trial were frustratingly incomplete: pages were missing, including the discussion of a possible resignation.
According to the testimony of CPEx members Paul Niculescu-Mizil and Ion Dincă during their trial, at this meeting, just like in Bulgaria and East Germany, two of the members of CPEx disagreed with the use of force to suppress the uprising. In response, Ceauşescu offered his resignation and asked the members of CPEx to elect another leader. However, other members of CPEx, including Gheorghe Oprea and Constantin Dăscălescu asked Ceauşescu not to resign, but to sack those two who opposed his decisions instead. Later that day, Ceauşescu left Romania to visit Iran leaving the task of resolving the uprising in Timişoara to his wife and other acolytes. According to one of the recent insider memoirs, following the Timişoara uprising, a group of conspiring Securitate generals took advantage of this opportunity to launch a coup in Bucharest. The coup, allegedly in preparation since 1982, was originally planned for New Year’s Eve, but it had to be redesigned on-the-move, so as to take advantage of the favourable developments. The lead-conspirator, General Stănculescu, was part of Ceauşescu’s inner circle, and he is said to have convinced the dictator to hold the mass rally in front of the Central Committee building, in a plaza that had already been prepared with remote-controlled automatic guns. During Ceauşescu's address, the remote-controlled automatic guns were set to fire randomly over the crowd while agitators would use bullhorns to instigate the crowd with anti-Ceauşescu slogans.
At one point, there was a battle over Otopeni Airport near Bucharest where each side apparently thought the other was fighting on behalf of Ceauşescu. This led to the question of who was shooting at whom, and which side did they think they were serving?
For several months after the events of December 1989, it was widely argued that Iliescu and the FSN had merely taken advantage of the chaos to stage a coup. While, ultimately, a great deal did change in Romania, it is still very contentious among Romanians and other observers as to whether this was their intent from the outset, or merely pragmatic playing of the cards they were dealt. What is clear is that by December 1989 Ceauşescu's harsh and counterproductive economic and political policies had cost him the support of many government officials and even the most loyal Communist Party cadres, most of whom joined forces with the popular revolution or simply refused to support him. This loss of support from regime officials ultimately set the stage for Ceauşescu's demise.
There are also many conspiracy theories about the roles of organizations such as the CIA and the KGB and their alleged involvement in the revolution.
The identity of the terrorists remains a mystery to this day. No person has ever been officially charged with committing acts of terrorism, and this fact has raised many suspicions concerning the relationship between the terrorists and the new government.
It is likely that there was an ongoing conspiracy by members of a second echelon of the Communist Party, supported by Moscow possibly since 1982. These conspirators took advantage of the events in Timisoara to begin their drive to power. The claimed "terrorist" activity of those days were likely diversions organised by the same communist party conspirators to scare the population into seeking a "savior" and therefore embrace the "Salvation Front" without looking for new, uncompromised leaders. The Front appeared very well organised and suddenly replaced most revolutionaries pushed forward by the people from the street. Another interesting coincidence is the fall of the communist regimes in all Eastern Europe at about the same time, even if most of the citizens of these countries were very isolated from one each other. The lack of drive for democratic change in 1989 Romania was and is poorly understood in the West. The large majority of the population only wanted a better life and not necessarily democracy or regime change. This explains why Iliescu, a member of the communist party since his youth and who always repeated his socialist ideals has been in power for almost all 1990s decade. The events in 1989 Romania were not a revolution, just a coup d'etat.
There are several conflicting views on the events in Bucharest that led to the fall of Ceauşescu in 1989. One view is that a portion of the Romanian Communist Party CPEx
(Political Executive Council) tried and failed to bring about a scenario similar to that in the rest of the Eastern bloc Communist countries, where the Communist leadership would resign en masse, allowing a new government to emerge peacefully. Another view is that a group of military officers successfully staged a conspiracy against Ceauşescu. Several officers have claimed that they had been part of a conspiracy directed against Ceauşescu, but evidence beyond their own claims is scant, at best. The latter view is buttressed by a series of interviews given 2003–04 by former Securitate Lieutenant Colonel Dumitru Burlan Ceauşescu’s long-time bodyguard. The two theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. [Romanian Revolution memorial right]In November 1989, Ceauşescu had visited Mikhail Gorbachev who asked him to resign: Ceauşescu flatly refused. The question of a possible resignation arose again on December 17. 1989 when Ceauşescu assembled the CPEx (Political Executive Council) to decide upon the necessary measures to crush the Timişoara uprising. Although meeting minutes were taken, and were presented at the trial of several CPEx members, the surviving stenograma (minutes) at the time of the trial were frustratingly incomplete: pages were missing, including the discussion of a possible resignation.
According to the testimony of CPEx members Paul Niculescu-Mizil and Ion Dincă during their trial, at this meeting, just like in Bulgaria and East Germany, two of the members of CPEx disagreed with the use of force to suppress the uprising. In response, Ceauşescu offered his resignation and asked the members of CPEx to elect another leader. However, other members of CPEx, including Gheorghe Oprea and Constantin Dăscălescu asked Ceauşescu not to resign, but to sack those two who opposed his decisions instead. Later that day, Ceauşescu left Romania to visit Iran leaving the task of resolving the uprising in Timişoara to his wife and other acolytes. According to one of the recent insider memoirs, following the Timişoara uprising, a group of conspiring Securitate generals took advantage of this opportunity to launch a coup in Bucharest. The coup, allegedly in preparation since 1982, was originally planned for New Year’s Eve, but it had to be redesigned on-the-move, so as to take advantage of the favourable developments. The lead-conspirator, General Stănculescu, was part of Ceauşescu’s inner circle, and he is said to have convinced the dictator to hold the mass rally in front of the Central Committee building, in a plaza that had already been prepared with remote-controlled automatic guns. During Ceauşescu's address, the remote-controlled automatic guns were set to fire randomly over the crowd while agitators would use bullhorns to instigate the crowd with anti-Ceauşescu slogans.
At one point, there was a battle over Otopeni Airport near Bucharest where each side apparently thought the other was fighting on behalf of Ceauşescu. This led to the question of who was shooting at whom, and which side did they think they were serving?
For several months after the events of December 1989, it was widely argued that Iliescu and the FSN had merely taken advantage of the chaos to stage a coup. While, ultimately, a great deal did change in Romania, it is still very contentious among Romanians and other observers as to whether this was their intent from the outset, or merely pragmatic playing of the cards they were dealt. What is clear is that by December 1989 Ceauşescu's harsh and counterproductive economic and political policies had cost him the support of many government officials and even the most loyal Communist Party cadres, most of whom joined forces with the popular revolution or simply refused to support him. This loss of support from regime officials ultimately set the stage for Ceauşescu's demise.
There are also many conspiracy theories about the roles of organizations such as the CIA and the KGB and their alleged involvement in the revolution.
The Rise of Ioan Iliescu:
In May 1990, partly due to the National Salvation Front's use of the media and of the partly preserved Communist Party infrastructure to silence the democratic opposition, Iliescu became Romania's first elected president after the revolution, with a majority of 85%. These elections have been condemned as undemocratic by both Romanian traditional parties and by the Western media. Iliescu, himself a former communist opperative (head of propoganda for years), could hardly have been seen as someone from the "outside" bringing change.Nonetheless, Iliescu proposed multi-party elections and an "original democracy". This is widely held to have meant the adoption of Perestroika-style reforms rather than the complete removal of existing institutions; it can be linked to the warm reception the new regime was given in Mikhail Gorbachev and the rest of the Soviet leadership, and the fact that the first post-revolutionary international agreement signed by Romania was with that country.
Iliescu did not renounce the communist ideology and the program he initially presented during the revolution included restructuring the agriculture and the reorganization of trade, but not a switch to capitalism. These views were held by other members of the FSN, such as Silviu Brucan, who claimed in early 1990 that the revolution was against Ceauşescu, not against communism. Iliescu later evoked the possibility of trying a "Swedish model" of socialism.
Iliescu did not renounce the communist ideology and the program he initially presented during the revolution included restructuring the agriculture and the reorganization of trade, but not a switch to capitalism. These views were held by other members of the FSN, such as Silviu Brucan, who claimed in early 1990 that the revolution was against Ceauşescu, not against communism. Iliescu later evoked the possibility of trying a "Swedish model" of socialism.
Under the pressure of the events that led to the Mineriads, his political stance has veered with time: from a proponent of the Perestroika, Iliescu became a neophyte social democrat, aligning himself with the Western European political spectrum. The main debate around the subject of his commitment to such ideals is linked to the special conditions in Romania, and especially to the strong nationalist and autarkic attitude visible within the Ceauşescu regime. Most critics have pointed out that, unlike most communist-to-social democrat changes in the Eastern bloc, Romania's tended to retain various cornerstones (sometimes expressed with scandalous traits - to the Mineriads themselves can be added the slogan of Iliescu supporters in the early 1990s, Noi nu ne vindem ţara! - "We will not sell off our country!").
The new Constitution was adopted in 1991, and in 1992 he won a second term when he received 61% of the vote. According to Romanian political analysts, his election was based almost exclusively on the rural population and disoriented lower class industrial workers, controlled through manipulation from the state-controlled media (Televiziunea Română, the state television, was the only wide-scale TV channel until 1993). He ran for a third time in 1996 but, stripped of media monopoly, that of virtually all urban citizens and even of some traditional votes, he lost to Emil Constantinescu. Over 1,000,000 votes were cancelled, leading to accusations of wide-spread fraud.
Allegations against Iliescu:
He, along with other figures in the leading FSN, was allegedly responsible for calling the Jiu Valley miners to Bucharest on 28 January and June 14, 1990 to end the protests of the citizens (mainly students) gathered in University Square, protests aimed against the ex-communist leaders of Romania. The miners descended on the capital, armed with wooden clubs and bats and attacked the protesters. They trashed the University of Bucharest, various museums, and the headquarters of opposition parties, claiming that they were havens of decadence and immorality - drugs, firearms and munitions, "an automatic typewriter", and fake currency the miners had claimed as evidence later proved to be either non-
existent, or (according to case) black and white copiers, or compressed air rifles used for target practice. The miners' violence led to an official figure of at least 6 dead (some sources estimate figures between 200 and 300 dead), with at least 5,000 injured. Miners shouted slogans such as Moarte intelectualilor! ("Death to intellectuals") or Noi muncim, nu gândim ("We work, don't think!" - implying legitimacy).
existent, or (according to case) black and white copiers, or compressed air rifles used for target practice. The miners' violence led to an official figure of at least 6 dead (some sources estimate figures between 200 and 300 dead), with at least 5,000 injured. Miners shouted slogans such as Moarte intelectualilor! ("Death to intellectuals") or Noi muncim, nu gândim ("We work, don't think!" - implying legitimacy).The official motives gathered from press reports stated that the crowd gathered in University Square held not only an unauthorised demonstration, which was still allowed to go on for days, but that these demonstrators were wielding un-democratic ideals and anarchist slogans, as well as being a danger to public health. At least this last part is verifiable, University Square being brought to unsanitary condition by the long and protracted demonstration that lasted for almost two months.
Iliescu later thanked the miners:
I thank you [miners] for all you've done these past few days, in general for your attitude of high civic conscience.
He expanded on this, declaring a right-wing liberal neo-fascist international conspiracy to have attempted the usurping of legitimate power and the destruction of the progressive left within Romania.
According to his lawyer and the military prosecutor Dan Voinea. Ion Iliescu has been recently placed under criminal law investigation (the official term for prosecution) with regard to the events that occurred in June 1990 in Bucharest. If convicted on all charges (that include crimes against humanity, accessory to murder and revolt, censorship), he faces life imprisonment.
I thank you [miners] for all you've done these past few days, in general for your attitude of high civic conscience.
He expanded on this, declaring a right-wing liberal neo-fascist international conspiracy to have attempted the usurping of legitimate power and the destruction of the progressive left within Romania.
According to his lawyer and the military prosecutor Dan Voinea. Ion Iliescu has been recently placed under criminal law investigation (the official term for prosecution) with regard to the events that occurred in June 1990 in Bucharest. If convicted on all charges (that include crimes against humanity, accessory to murder and revolt, censorship), he faces life imprisonment.
Constitution Violations
Iliescu is accused by his opponents of having held three terms in office (four, counting the one between December 1989 and June 1990), although the Constitution, adopted in 1991, during his first mandate (1990-1992), was not to allow it. Before his unsuccessful campaign of 1996, the Constitutional Court of Romania ruled in favor of his third candidature and henceforth of his third presidency, begun in 2000. In view of this, the accusation can be described as biased, since it ignores the illegitimacy of ex post facto legislation within the framework of Romanian constitutionalism.
KGB connections
In 1995, the Ziua newspaper published an interview with an ex-KGB officer who declared that Ion Iliescu was a KGB inductee. Iliescu denied any involvement, and Ziua journalists began to investigate the topic in detail. However, only a few days later, Ziua alleged that its employees were being placed under the surveillance of the Romanian Intelligence Service – the official explanation was that the secret service was in fact watching a spy that lived nearby.
The scandal on his alleged connections continued in 2003, when Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky who had been granted access to Soviet archives, declared that Iliescu and most of the Salvation Front members were KGB agents, that Iliescu had been in close connection with Mikhail Gorbachev ever since they had allegedly met during Iliescu's stay in Moscow, and that the Romanian Revolution of 1989 was a plot organized by the KGB - in order to regain control of the country's policies (gradually lost under Ceauşescu's rule).
Four years of leadership under Emil Constantinescu
After winning a November 17 runoff against Ion Iliescu, Constantinescu was sworn in as president on November 29 and appointed Victor Ciorbea, the mayor of Bucharest, as Prime Minister of Romania.
The year 1997 in Romania began with great expectations. Initially, support for the new government was high, and a large segment of the population favored change. In February 1997,
the Ciorbea government initiated its "shock therapy" programme, however the reform proved difficult: given the slow pace of privatisation and the stagnation during the previous government, the government's attempt to restructure the state industries was fitful, and the pace of privatisation was slowed. Blaming the old bureaucratic structures, Ciorbea launched a drive to streamline the various departments from the top down. These changes were promptly attacked as "political purges" by the opposition parties.
The reason for the delaying reforms can be explained by the lack of homogeneity and consensus of the coalition formed of three political alliances.Widespread disagreement and tension surfaced within each of the three groupings, as well as between them, and nearly every political formation was plagued by infighting and rifts.
This perpetual friction slowed down the lawmaking process, producing constant delays in adopting laws by Parliament, and forced the Cabinet to resort to "emergency ordinances" to speed it up. This made many Romanians feel that the normal democratic process was circumvented. Coalition solidarity manifested, however, when the government rejected the flurry of no-confidence and nonbinding motions initiated by the opposition, such as the one introduced in mid-December that would have held the government responsible for the plummeting living standards.
By August, the government had admitted that living standards were still falling, and announced the closing of 14 loss-making state enterprises. A government reshuffle was attempted, but was only completed on 2 December, and it succeeded in only plunging the coalition into a severe crisis once two key PD ministers resigned from the cabinet. One-third of the ministerial posts, including finance, reform, and industry and commerce, were affected. A privatization ministry was created to replace several institutions with overlapping responsibilities. Only days later, however, the Cabinet was again plunged into crisis when the two UDMR ministers boycotted meetings to protest the coalition's failure to permit education of the country's large Magyar minority in the Hungarian language in all subjects. Foreign Minister Adrian Severin of the Democratic Party (PD, the leading force in the USD) resigned on December 23 after he claimed that some party leaders and media directors were working for foreign secret services. The crisis ended only when Ciorbea resigned in 1998, both as Prime Minister of Romania and Mayor of Bucharest.
By this time, dissatisfaction with government policies was rising. This led to a wave of protests by workers, students, and others that peaked in October.
the Ciorbea government initiated its "shock therapy" programme, however the reform proved difficult: given the slow pace of privatisation and the stagnation during the previous government, the government's attempt to restructure the state industries was fitful, and the pace of privatisation was slowed. Blaming the old bureaucratic structures, Ciorbea launched a drive to streamline the various departments from the top down. These changes were promptly attacked as "political purges" by the opposition parties.The reason for the delaying reforms can be explained by the lack of homogeneity and consensus of the coalition formed of three political alliances.Widespread disagreement and tension surfaced within each of the three groupings, as well as between them, and nearly every political formation was plagued by infighting and rifts.
This perpetual friction slowed down the lawmaking process, producing constant delays in adopting laws by Parliament, and forced the Cabinet to resort to "emergency ordinances" to speed it up. This made many Romanians feel that the normal democratic process was circumvented. Coalition solidarity manifested, however, when the government rejected the flurry of no-confidence and nonbinding motions initiated by the opposition, such as the one introduced in mid-December that would have held the government responsible for the plummeting living standards.
By August, the government had admitted that living standards were still falling, and announced the closing of 14 loss-making state enterprises. A government reshuffle was attempted, but was only completed on 2 December, and it succeeded in only plunging the coalition into a severe crisis once two key PD ministers resigned from the cabinet. One-third of the ministerial posts, including finance, reform, and industry and commerce, were affected. A privatization ministry was created to replace several institutions with overlapping responsibilities. Only days later, however, the Cabinet was again plunged into crisis when the two UDMR ministers boycotted meetings to protest the coalition's failure to permit education of the country's large Magyar minority in the Hungarian language in all subjects. Foreign Minister Adrian Severin of the Democratic Party (PD, the leading force in the USD) resigned on December 23 after he claimed that some party leaders and media directors were working for foreign secret services. The crisis ended only when Ciorbea resigned in 1998, both as Prime Minister of Romania and Mayor of Bucharest.
By this time, dissatisfaction with government policies was rising. This led to a wave of protests by workers, students, and others that peaked in October.
Economic Difficulties
With an eye to EU requirements, Romania had met a $2 billion debt service due in mid-1999 but at a cost of depleting its foreign exchange reserves. The privatization agency earned praise abroad in 1999 for quickening the pace of sell-offs in a country where 80% of the economy was still in state hands. It was assailed, however, along with other reformers, by private television stations whose influence had soared as the reputation of politicians slumped.
Eventually, Romania had only a few months to draw up an economic strategy for the period 2000–06 in order to prepare Romania for accession to the European Union (EU). Isarescu won praise for persuading the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), the main opposition party, to endorse a policy committing Romania to a steady shift toward a market economy. Enjoying a runaway lead in the opinion polls, the PDSR was committed to an economic strategy drawn up in conjunction with officials from the EU, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
A modest recovery at the beginning of 2000 suffered a setback by a severe drought, and a subsequent bad harvest, requiring costly imports of grain and foodstuffs.
Eventually, Romania had only a few months to draw up an economic strategy for the period 2000–06 in order to prepare Romania for accession to the European Union (EU). Isarescu won praise for persuading the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), the main opposition party, to endorse a policy committing Romania to a steady shift toward a market economy. Enjoying a runaway lead in the opinion polls, the PDSR was committed to an economic strategy drawn up in conjunction with officials from the EU, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
A modest recovery at the beginning of 2000 suffered a setback by a severe drought, and a subsequent bad harvest, requiring costly imports of grain and foodstuffs.
Foreign Policy
The government's foreign policy was seen as a strong point. It adopted a pro-Western stance, and early in its mandate launched a diplomatic offensive to improve the image of Romania abroad. President Constantinescu received senior foreign officials, including French President Jacques Chirac (February 1997) and U.S. President Bill Clinton (July 1997).
Joining NATO and the European Union were proclaimed Romania's top foreign policy priorities. With these objectives in mind, Romania sought to improve relations with its neighbours and signed a basic treaty with Ukraine in June. The country was nonetheless passed over in the first wave of expansion by both NATO and the EU.
In March 1998 Constantinescu attended the London conference of European Union member states and candidates, and in July he took advantage of a nine-day visit in the U.S. to argue before a joint session of Congress that his country played a key role in Balkan stability and should therefore be admitted to NATO. In October Romania agreed to allow limited access to its air space in the event of NATO military intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo.
Joining NATO and the European Union were proclaimed Romania's top foreign policy priorities. With these objectives in mind, Romania sought to improve relations with its neighbours and signed a basic treaty with Ukraine in June. The country was nonetheless passed over in the first wave of expansion by both NATO and the EU.In March 1998 Constantinescu attended the London conference of European Union member states and candidates, and in July he took advantage of a nine-day visit in the U.S. to argue before a joint session of Congress that his country played a key role in Balkan stability and should therefore be admitted to NATO. In October Romania agreed to allow limited access to its air space in the event of NATO military intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo.
Aftermath of his presidency
The CDR government's results were disastrous. Romanians exhibited strong disillusionment with the major parties and politicians. Many now viewed them as a separate caste whose primary aim was to protect special corporate interests rather than the common good. A disenchanted Emil Constantinescu, who lost popularity and had failed to fulfill his reformist agenda announced that he would not run for a second term. He temporarily withdrew from political life at the end of his term in November 2000.
However, the former President returned to the political scene in 2002 as head of the Acţiunea populară (People's Action) party. On the international level, he committed himself to the eventual integration of Romania into the European Union (2007) and NATO (2004) structures; to the strengthening of bilateral links with other countries as well as to the implementation of trilateral political and economic agreements among states.
However, the former President returned to the political scene in 2002 as head of the Acţiunea populară (People's Action) party. On the international level, he committed himself to the eventual integration of Romania into the European Union (2007) and NATO (2004) structures; to the strengthening of bilateral links with other countries as well as to the implementation of trilateral political and economic agreements among states.
Iliescu Returns:
Following Constantinescu's refusal to seek re-election, Iliescu again rose to power from 2000-2004, raising the question of whether Romania was ever to totally distance itself from its past communist ties. Throughout this period, however, Romania literally began changing rapidly (some would say overnight). Romania ascended to the EU, welcomed numerous foreign investors, and Romanians began to become acclimated to some of the luxuries of the West that had long aluded them (shopping malls, hiper-markets, modern-day factories, etc.). Romania began to finally turn the corner towards modernization....the revolution was only just beginning.
Sunday, May 11, 2008
Global Day of Prayer
Thursday, May 08, 2008
The Romanian Revolution: Part I
The Romanian Revolution of 1989 was a week-long series of increasingly violent riots and fighting in late December 1989 that overthrew the Communist regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu, and after a summary trial, the execution of Ceauşescu and his wife Elena by firing squad. Romania was the only Eastern Bloc country to overthrow its Communist regime violently or to execute its leaders.Background:
As in neighboring countries, by 1989 the bulk of the Romanian populace were dissatisfied with the Communist regime. However, unlike other Eastern Bloc countries, Romania had never undergone even limited de-Stalinization. Ceauşescu's economic and development policies (including grandiose construction projects such as the grandiose Palace of the Parliament and a draconian austerity program designed to enable Romania to liquidate its entire national debt in only a few years) were generally blamed for the country's painful shortages and widespread, increasing poverty. Parallel with increasing poverty, the secret police (Securitate) were becoming so ubiquitous as to make Romania essentially a police state.
By 1989, Ceauşescu was showing signs of a complete denial of reality. While Romania had the lowest living standards in any of the Eastern Bloc nations, Ceauşescu seemed to have no awareness of this, believing that he had brought Romania to one of the highest standards of living ever known to mankind, actually believing that he turned Romania into a Utopia. Ceauşescu claimed that under his regime the arts were flourishing, healthcare was at an all-time high, the sciences were making breakthrough discoveries, and Romania was making record harvests, enough to serve the country for years to come. All the people really got was a lifetime of propaganda, barrack-like apartments, physically insolvent healthcare services (resulting in a huge HIV epidemic), crippling energy shortages, and hours of waiting outside empty bread ration stores. Not to mention that all sc
ientific discoveries were to be credited to Ceauşescu's hated wife Elena. Also, while people were suffering under his disastrous policies, Ceauşescu and his family were living the high life, with large palaces boasting luxuries outseating even today's standards.
By 1989, Ceauşescu was showing signs of a complete denial of reality. While Romania had the lowest living standards in any of the Eastern Bloc nations, Ceauşescu seemed to have no awareness of this, believing that he had brought Romania to one of the highest standards of living ever known to mankind, actually believing that he turned Romania into a Utopia. Ceauşescu claimed that under his regime the arts were flourishing, healthcare was at an all-time high, the sciences were making breakthrough discoveries, and Romania was making record harvests, enough to serve the country for years to come. All the people really got was a lifetime of propaganda, barrack-like apartments, physically insolvent healthcare services (resulting in a huge HIV epidemic), crippling energy shortages, and hours of waiting outside empty bread ration stores. Not to mention that all sc
ientific discoveries were to be credited to Ceauşescu's hated wife Elena. Also, while people were suffering under his disastrous policies, Ceauşescu and his family were living the high life, with large palaces boasting luxuries outseating even today's standards. Unlike the other Warsaw Pact leaders, Ceauşescu had not been slavishly pro-Soviet, but rather had pursued an "independent" foreign policy. While Soviet leader Gorbachev spoke of reform, Ceauşescu emulated the political hard-line, megalomania, and personality cults of East Asian communist leaders such as North Korea's Kim il Sung. Even after the Berlin Wall fell and Ceauşescu's closest comrades, GDR's leader Eric Honecker resigned, and Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov was replaced in November 1989, Ceauşescu ignored the threat to his position as the last old-style communist leader in Eastern Europe.
Timişoara Protest:
On December 16,, a protest broke out in Timişoara in response to an attempt by the government to evict a dissident, Hungarian Reformed pastor László Tőkés. Tőkés had recently made critical comments toward the regime in the international media, and the government alleged that he was inciting ethnic hatred. At the behest of the government, his bishop removed him from his post, thereby depriving him of the right to use the apartment he was entitled to as a pastor. For some time, his parishioners gathered around his home to protect him from harassment and eviction. Many passers-by, including religious Romanian students, unaware of the details and having been told by the pastor's supporters that this was yet another attempt of the communist regime to restrict religious freedom, spontaneously joined in.As it became clear that the crowd would not disperse, the mayor, Petre Moţ, made remarks suggesting that he had overturned the decision to evict Tőkés. Meanwhile, the crowd had grown impatient — and since Moţ declined to confirm his statement against the planned eviction in writing, the crowd started to chant anticommunist slogans. Consequently, police and Securitate forces showed up at the scene. By 7:30 p.m., the protest had spread out, and the original cause became largely irrelevant. The Securitate responded with tear gas and water jets, while the
police beat up rioters and arrested many of them. Around 9:00 p.m., the rioters withdrew. They regrouped eventually around the Romanian Orthodox Cathedral and started a protest march around the city, but again they were confronted by the security forces.
Riots and protests resumed the following day, December 17. The rioters broke into the District Committee building and threw Party documents, propaganda brochures, Ceauşescu's writings, and other symbols of communist power out the windows. Since Romania did not have a riot police (Ceauşescu, who belived the Romanian people loved him, never saw the need for the formation of one), the military were sent in to control the riots, since the situtation was too large for the Securitate and police to handle. The significance of the army presence in the streets was an ominous one: it meant that they had received their orders from the highest level of the command chain, presumably from Ceauşescu himself. Although the army failed to establish order, it succeeded in turning Timişoara into a living hell: gunfire, casualties, fights and burning cars.
police beat up rioters and arrested many of them. Around 9:00 p.m., the rioters withdrew. They regrouped eventually around the Romanian Orthodox Cathedral and started a protest march around the city, but again they were confronted by the security forces.Riots and protests resumed the following day, December 17. The rioters broke into the District Committee building and threw Party documents, propaganda brochures, Ceauşescu's writings, and other symbols of communist power out the windows. Since Romania did not have a riot police (Ceauşescu, who belived the Romanian people loved him, never saw the need for the formation of one), the military were sent in to control the riots, since the situtation was too large for the Securitate and police to handle. The significance of the army presence in the streets was an ominous one: it meant that they had received their orders from the highest level of the command chain, presumably from Ceauşescu himself. Although the army failed to establish order, it succeeded in turning Timişoara into a living hell: gunfire, casualties, fights and burning cars.
Revolt Spreads to Bucharest:
On the morning of December 21, Ceauşescu addressed an assembly of approximately 110,000 people, to condemn the uprising in Timişoara. However, Ceauşescu was completely out of touch with his people, and completely misread the crowd's mood. Starting his speech, Ceauşescu delivered a litany of the achievements of the "socialist revolution" and Romanian "multi-laterally developed socialist society." The people, however, remained apathetic, and only the front rows supported Ceauşescu with cheers and applause. His lack of understanding of the recent events and his incapacity to handle the situation were further demonstrated when he offered, as an act of desperation, to raise workers' salaries by 100 lei per month (about 4 US dollars at the time, yet a 5-10% raise for a modest salary) while continuing to praise the achievements of the Socialist Revolution.
As he was addressing the crowd from the balcony of the Central Committee building, sudden movement came from the outskirts of the massed assembly, as did the sound of (what various sources have reported as) fireworks, bombs, or guns, which together caused the assembly to break into chaos. Initially frightened, the crowds tried to disperse. Bullhorns then began to spread the news that the Securitate was firing on the crowd and that a "revolution" was unfolding. This persuaded people in the assembly to join in. The rally turned into a protest
demonstration.
The entire speech was being broadcast live around Romania, and it is estimated that perhaps 76% of the nation was watching. Censors attempted to cut the live video feed, and replace it with communist propaganda songs and video praising the Ceauşescu regime, but parts of the riots had already been broadcast and most of the Romanian people realized that something unusual was in progress.
Ceauşescu and his wife, as well as other officials and CPEx members, panicked, and Ceauşescu went into hiding inside the building.
The reaction of the Ceauşescu couple on the balcony is memorable: They staged futile attempts to regain control over the uprising crowd using phone conversation formulas such as "Alo, Alo" ("Hello, Hello"), Ceauşescu's wife "advised" him how to contain the situation "Vorbeşte-le, vorbeşte-le" ("Talk to them, talk to them"), and they urged the crowd "Staţi liniştiţi la locurile voastre" ("Sit quiet in your places"). In the end Ceauşescu allowed himself to be directed into the Central Committee building by his underlings.
The jeers and whistles soon erupted into riot; the crowd took to the streets, placing the capital, like Timişoara, in turmoil. Members of the crowd spontaneously began shouting anti-communist and anti-Ceauşescu slogans, which spread and became chants: "Jos dictatorul!" ("Down with the dictator"), "Moarte criminalului!" ("Death to the murderer"), "Noi suntem poporul, jos cu dictatorul!" ("We are the People, down with the dictator"), "Ceauşescu cine eşti?/Criminal din Scorniceşti" ("Ceauşescu, who are you? A murderer from Scorniceşti").
As he was addressing the crowd from the balcony of the Central Committee building, sudden movement came from the outskirts of the massed assembly, as did the sound of (what various sources have reported as) fireworks, bombs, or guns, which together caused the assembly to break into chaos. Initially frightened, the crowds tried to disperse. Bullhorns then began to spread the news that the Securitate was firing on the crowd and that a "revolution" was unfolding. This persuaded people in the assembly to join in. The rally turned into a protest
demonstration.The entire speech was being broadcast live around Romania, and it is estimated that perhaps 76% of the nation was watching. Censors attempted to cut the live video feed, and replace it with communist propaganda songs and video praising the Ceauşescu regime, but parts of the riots had already been broadcast and most of the Romanian people realized that something unusual was in progress.
Ceauşescu and his wife, as well as other officials and CPEx members, panicked, and Ceauşescu went into hiding inside the building.
The reaction of the Ceauşescu couple on the balcony is memorable: They staged futile attempts to regain control over the uprising crowd using phone conversation formulas such as "Alo, Alo" ("Hello, Hello"), Ceauşescu's wife "advised" him how to contain the situation "Vorbeşte-le, vorbeşte-le" ("Talk to them, talk to them"), and they urged the crowd "Staţi liniştiţi la locurile voastre" ("Sit quiet in your places"). In the end Ceauşescu allowed himself to be directed into the Central Committee building by his underlings.
The jeers and whistles soon erupted into riot; the crowd took to the streets, placing the capital, like Timişoara, in turmoil. Members of the crowd spontaneously began shouting anti-communist and anti-Ceauşescu slogans, which spread and became chants: "Jos dictatorul!" ("Down with the dictator"), "Moarte criminalului!" ("Death to the murderer"), "Noi suntem poporul, jos cu dictatorul!" ("We are the People, down with the dictator"), "Ceauşescu cine eşti?/Criminal din Scorniceşti" ("Ceauşescu, who are you? A murderer from Scorniceşti").
As the hours passed, many more people took to the streets. Soon the protesters — unarmed and unorganized — were confronted by soldiers, tanks, TABs, troops , and armed plain-clothes Securitate officers. The crowd was soon being shot at from various buildings, side streets, and tanks. There were many casualties, including deaths, as victims were shot, clubbed to death, stabbed, and crushed by armored vehicles (one TAB drove into the
crowd around the Intercontinental Hotel, crushing people — a French journalist, Jean Louis Calderon, was killed; a street near University Square was later named after him). Firefighters hit the demonstrators with powerful water jets and the police continued to beat and arrest people. Protesters managed to build a defensible barricade in front of Dunărea ("Danube") restaurant, which stood until after midnight, but was finally torn apart by government forces.
crowd around the Intercontinental Hotel, crushing people — a French journalist, Jean Louis Calderon, was killed; a street near University Square was later named after him). Firefighters hit the demonstrators with powerful water jets and the police continued to beat and arrest people. Protesters managed to build a defensible barricade in front of Dunărea ("Danube") restaurant, which stood until after midnight, but was finally torn apart by government forces.It is likely that in the small hours of December 22, Ceauşescu made the second mistake of the day because instead of fleeing the city at night they decided to wait until morning to leave. Ceauşescu must have thought that his desperate attempts to crush the protests had succeeded, because he apparently called another meeting for the next morning. However, before 7:00 a.m., his wife Elena received the news that large columns of workers from many industrial platforms (large communist-era factories or groups of factories concentrated into industrial zones) were heading towards downtown Bucharest. The police barricades that were meant to block access to Piaţa Universităţii (University Square) and Piaţa Palatului (Palace Square, now Piaţa Revoluţiei— Revolution Square) proved useless. By 9:30 a.m., University Square was jammed with protestors. Security forces (army, police and others) re-entered the area, only to join with the protesters.
By 10 A.M., as the radio broadcast was announcing the introduction of martial law and of a ban on groups larger than five persons, yet hundreds of thousands of people were gathering for the first time, spontaneously, in central Bucharest (the previous day's crowd had come together at Ceauşescu's orders). Ceauşescu attempted to address the crowd from the balcony of the Central Committee of the Communist Party building, but his attempt was met with a wave of disapproval and anger. Helicopters spread manifestos (which did not reach the crowd, due to unfavourable winds) instructing people not to fall victim to the latest "diversion attempts," but to go home instead and enjoy the Christmas feast (which infuriated the people more since it was compared to Marie Anntonetes "Let them Eat the Cake!" quote since the Romanian people even had trouble receiving cooking oil).
By 10 A.M., as the radio broadcast was announcing the introduction of martial law and of a ban on groups larger than five persons, yet hundreds of thousands of people were gathering for the first time, spontaneously, in central Bucharest (the previous day's crowd had come together at Ceauşescu's orders). Ceauşescu attempted to address the crowd from the balcony of the Central Committee of the Communist Party building, but his attempt was met with a wave of disapproval and anger. Helicopters spread manifestos (which did not reach the crowd, due to unfavourable winds) instructing people not to fall victim to the latest "diversion attempts," but to go home instead and enjoy the Christmas feast (which infuriated the people more since it was compared to Marie Anntonetes "Let them Eat the Cake!" quote since the Romanian people even had trouble receiving cooking oil).
Ceauşescu Falls:
On the morning of December 22, sometime between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m., Vasile Milea, Ceauşescu's minister of defense, died under suspicious circumstances. A communiqué by Ceauşescu stated that Milea had been found to be a traitor and that he had committed suicide after his treason was revealed. The most widespread opinion at the time was that Milea had been assassinated because of his refusal to follow Ceauşescu's orders. In 2005 an investigation
concluded that the minister killed himself. It seems, though, that his intention was only to incapacitate himself in order to be relieved from office, but the bullet accidentally hit an artery and he died soon afterwards.
concluded that the minister killed himself. It seems, though, that his intention was only to incapacitate himself in order to be relieved from office, but the bullet accidentally hit an artery and he died soon afterwards.Upon learning of Milea's apparent suicide, Ceauşescu appointed Victor Stănculescu as minister of defense. He accepted after a brief hesitation. Stănculescu, however, ordered the troops back to their quarters without Ceauşescu's knowledge, and moreover persuaded Ceauşescu to leave by helicopter, thus making the dictator a fugitive. By refusing to carry out Ceauşescu's (who was still technically commander-in-chief of the army) orders, Stănculescu played a central role in the overthrow of the dictatorship. "I had the prospect of two execution squads: Ceauşescu's and the revolutionary one!" confessed Stănculescu later. In the afternoon, Stănculescu "chose" Iliescu's political group from among others that were striving for power in the aftermath of the recent events.
Ceauşescu and his wife Elena then fled the capital city by helicopter, accompanied by two loyal aides, Emil Bobu and Tudor Postelnicu. They headed for Ceauşescu's Snagov residence, and from there to Târgovişte. Near Târgovişte, at Boteni, they abandoned the
helicopter, whose pilot claimed that he was ordered to land by the army. By that time the army had closed all Romanian airspace. The Ceauşescus hitchhiked into Târgovişte. After some wandering through the industrial outskirts of the town, the couple decided to enter a building near a local steel plant. An engineer there recognized them and called the police. A nearby traffic police unit arrived and took the Ceauşescus to the local police headquarters, and afterwards to the army barracks across the street. There the Ceauşescus were informed that they had been arrested. On December 25, Christmas Day, the former dictator of Romania and his wife were sentenced to death by an ad hoc military court on a range of charges including genocide, and were executed by firing squad in Târgovişte.
Footage of the trial and execution was promptly released in France and other western countries; an edited version (lacking footage of the actual execution) was released on television the same day for the Romanian public. Thus to Romanians, Christmas Day is known as the day the dictator fell.
Ceauşescu and his wife Elena then fled the capital city by helicopter, accompanied by two loyal aides, Emil Bobu and Tudor Postelnicu. They headed for Ceauşescu's Snagov residence, and from there to Târgovişte. Near Târgovişte, at Boteni, they abandoned the
helicopter, whose pilot claimed that he was ordered to land by the army. By that time the army had closed all Romanian airspace. The Ceauşescus hitchhiked into Târgovişte. After some wandering through the industrial outskirts of the town, the couple decided to enter a building near a local steel plant. An engineer there recognized them and called the police. A nearby traffic police unit arrived and took the Ceauşescus to the local police headquarters, and afterwards to the army barracks across the street. There the Ceauşescus were informed that they had been arrested. On December 25, Christmas Day, the former dictator of Romania and his wife were sentenced to death by an ad hoc military court on a range of charges including genocide, and were executed by firing squad in Târgovişte.Footage of the trial and execution was promptly released in France and other western countries; an edited version (lacking footage of the actual execution) was released on television the same day for the Romanian public. Thus to Romanians, Christmas Day is known as the day the dictator fell.
Thursday, May 01, 2008
Peniel: National Youth Conference
- Life lived to the full does not mean fame and riches, success, etc., but rather, life lived with Christ in the fellowship of the Father.
- His grace is greater than our sin
- Neither the extreme of legalism or complete freedom in the Church is ideal: balance is needed
- We always need to be attentive to those around us and our spheres of influence--you never know when God will open a door for you to share Christ with someone or to speak truth into someone's life
It was a good conference with thousands in attendance. The greatest part of the conference was watching the hundreds of Romanian youth who made decisions for Christ or who came forward to confess, repent, or transform. Please pray that these youth will continue to grow in faith and knowledge and that the Christians around them would befriend them, encourage them, and pray with/for them.
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